ity, which is important since histone acetylation was previously shown to contribute to the activation of genes controlled by CLOCK/BMAL1. Doi et al. found that the HAT activity of CLOCK is essential for circadian regulation, as rhythms in mouse embryonic fibroblasts from Clock D19/D19 mice can be rescued by full-length CLOCK but not by HAT-deficient CLOCK. Thus, it is even more surprising that Clock 2/2 mice show strong rhythms. Presumably there is another circadian HAT, but it seems unlikely that NPAS2 fulfills this function, as the homology to CLOCK is low at the carboxy terminus.
The redundancy that allows rhythms in the absence of CLOCK may reflect the underlying complexity of the molecular clock itself. Many clock proteins are posttranscriptionally regulated to control their rates of accumulation, nuclear entry, and degradation. This presumably allows clocks to keep track of time even when genes are constitutively expressed or expressed with a lower amplitude than normal-as long as they are expressed to some degree. Rhythms in the absence of CLOCK could also arise from the clock network formed by intracellular interactions between pacemaker cells in the SCN. Animal behavior requires so many genes to be regulated in different ways at different times of the day in different tissues that an intracellular feedback loop with a minimal number of core factors is simply not up to the task. Brain insults can result in amnesia for recent events but has less effect on memories that have had time to mature. The common observation of temporally graded retrograde amnesia has led to the prevalent hypothesis that memories undergo consolidation, an extended process through which memories become more permanent. But we are woefully ignorant about what goes on in the brain during this shadowy afterlife of experiences. We do know that there are two distinct types of consolidation: a modification of synaptic efficacy that is characterized by molecular events and a system integration that involves interplay between the hippocampus and cortical areas (Dudai, 2004) . Historically, the view has been that each process, once begun, normally runs its course to a completion without further influence. Now we know this idea is too simplistic. Recent observations have suggested that synaptic consolidation can be reinitiated by reminders (Przybyslawski and Sara, 1997; Nader et al., 2000) . In these experiments, sufficient time after a learning experience was allowed for synaptic consolidation to complete. Then, when given a reminder of the task, the subject's memory became again susceptible to disruption by an agent that blocks synaptic consolidation. The interpretation was that the reminder initiates ''reconsolidation,'' a recapitulation of synaptic consolidation processes. Many expressed skepticism about how the molecular events in synaptic consolidation could be reversed (Dudai, 2004) , but the phenomenon has been replicated and extended, reassuring us that whatever the susceptibility after reminders is, it is a real phenomenon that requires an explanation.
Ben
Our understanding of system consolidation has also evolved. The standard notion is that the hippocampus initially encodes a new experience by linking cortical representations, and then repetitive iterations of cortical-hippocampal-cortical interaction strengthen intracortical connections (Squire and Alvarez, 1995) . Eventually, the cortical areas become sufficiently connected so that retrieving all the elements of memory no longer requires the assistance of the hippocampus. This notion was elaborated by McClelland et al. (1995) who argued that focused strengthening of new connections in a cortex that contains related memories would corrupt the pre-existing memory network, resulting in ''catastrophic interference'' of the older memories. They proposed an influential model in which new representations are rapidly formed in the hippocampus, not in the cortex. Subsequently the hippocampus replays those memories repeatedly into a cortex that also frequently re-experiences through daily life aspects of its previously stored memories. Through numerous iterations of new and old memory replays, the cortical network gradually changes to interleave the new information within the network such that the revised network supports both the new and old memories.
The fundamental tenet of hippocampal-cortical interplay has been supported by recent studies revealing complementary activation patterns during retrieval at different points in the consolidation process, such that the hippocampus, and not the cortex, is activated during retrieval shortly after learning, whereas the reverse pattern, cortical and not hippocampal activation, is observed as consolidation is completed Ross and Eichenbaum, 2006) . These findings support the notion that the cortex depends on inputs from early-established memories in the hippocampus to form a long-term representation that ultimately guides remembering. In addition, recent evidence indicates that reconsolidation also occurs at the system level. Debiec et al. (2002) showed that a reminder presented after consolidation of a hippocampal-dependent memory is completed can reinitiate susceptibility to hippocampal damage. This finding begs the question of what role reminders play in the interleaving of hippocampal memories into the cortical network.
The findings of Morris et al. (2006) in this issue of Neuron suggest the possibility that reconsolidation reflects an interaction between synaptic and system consolidations. Morris and his colleagues studied reconsolidation in two variations of the water maze task. In the standard task, rats were trained over multiple days to find an escape platform in the same place each day. In the delayed matching to place (DMP) version of the task, the platform locus was changed every day, requiring rats to learn a new platform position within each session. After equivalent training on one of these tasks, rats were then allowed to swim in the maze without escape (the reminder) and then treated with a pharmacological blocker of synaptic consolidation (anisomycin) or placebo. In subsequent testing, the performance of rats trained on the standard task was not disrupted by the reminder-treatment combination, indicating reconsolidation was not invoked for a well-established memory. However, the performance of rats trained in the DMP task fell to chance, lower than if they had merely forgotten the most recent escape locus. This observation indicates the treatment had prevented expression of the memories established even before the learning the most recent escape locus, therefore suggesting reconsolidation normally occurs in the DMP protocol.
The authors concluded that ''engagement of a memoryencoding mode during spatial memory retrieval may be a requirement for reconsolidation to be observed.'' Notably, this new encoding happens precisely when one would expect that the hippocampal-cortical system is interleaving the new information into the existing network of previous experiences in the maze. So, could there be a connection between synaptic and system processes that accounts for reconsolidation in this paradigm? For the DMP task, the McClelland et al., (1995) model would predict that the most recent experience is initially encoded into the hippocampus, whereas the cortex contains a network of memories for the structure of the maze, task rules, and knowledge about previous platform locations ( Figure 1A) . Then, during system consolidation, the new specific information is normally interleaved within the established cortical network over an extended period ( Figure 1B ) (Remondes and Schuman, 2004; Winocur et al., 2005) . At completion, a representation of the newest platform position is fit into the cortical network among modifications of the pre-existing representations ( Figure 1C) .
A treatment-induced block of synaptic consolidation of the hippocampal representation might be expected to cut short the interleaving process ( Figure 1D Pictured are representations of the course of system consolidation (A-C) of a newly acquired associative memory (green squares), stored initially in the hippocampus (small box) and subsequently interleaved within a pre-existing memory network (white circles) in the cortex (large box). A disruption of this process occurs when the synaptic consolidation of a representation of a newly stored reminder is blocked (D). This may prevent the interleaving process, sending incomplete information to the cortex that corrupts the preexisting memory network without storing the new memory (E).
interference from the new experience when it cannot benefit from multiple iterations of the new information that should be coming from the hippocampus. Thus, what does get to the cortex corrupts the old information without overwriting or interleaving a new representation that would support memory expression ( Figure 1E ).
This account of Morris and colleagues' findings is speculative, but it does incorporate the observation of reconsolidation at both the synaptic and system level. Additional recent findings also support the suggestion that reconsolidation involves alterations in the network representation and its dynamics. Whether reconsolidation occurs depends on the strength of the memory and the time since its formation (Berman and Dudai, 2001; Milekic and Alberini, 2002; Suzuki et al., 2004) . Also, instead of blocking reconsolidation, sometimes a reminder event acts as an extinction trial, whose consolidation is prevented by blocking agents, resulting in the reminder-plus-treatment animals exhibiting stronger memory for the initial learning than control subjects, the opposite of the expected result of blocking reconsolidation. Most compelling is the finding that if the consolidation blocking treatment is applied before extinction is complete, the original association is inhibited (indicating reconsolidation), whereas if the same treatment is applied in a later retrieval session, the extinction is impaired (Eisenberg et al., 2003) . These findings, combined with the current observations by Morris et al., support the notion that every new experience, whether it is new learning or a reminder of past events, must be interleaved with the pre-existing knowledge structure. Mucking with the persistence of the new representation may lead the network into a state of catastrophic interference rather than interleaving, leaving the animal at a loss.
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